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ERROR AND THREAT DETECTION: A REVIEWAND EVALUATION OF CURRENT LITERATURE
Christina Frederick-Recascino and Michael Gosiewski
ABSTRACT

The present project provides a comprehensive review of the literature related to threat and error detection.
Although there are current models for understanding the concepts of error and threat, little is known about how
individuals detect errors and threats when they occur. Awareness of error and threat is crucial for advancement of
safety in the aviation domain. Four areas were discussed related to error and threat detection. First, the general error
and threat detection literature was reviewed. Second, the physiological foundations for error and threat detection were
discussed. Third, the paper examined cognitive aspects of error and threat detection. Last, the paper elaborated on the
role emotion may play in threat detection. The review concludes with suggestions for error and threat management
and courses of action that can be taken within the aviation domain to train individuals in error and threat detection.

A primary goal of aviation is to ensure passenger
safety. One means by which safety has been enhanced is
through the use of the Line Oriented Safety Audit (LOSA).
LOSA is a fundamentallynew process that monitors cockpit
behavior of pilots and identifies those actions that are made
in error (Maurino, 2002). LOSA deviates fiom traditional
CRM or flight checks in that it is assumed that error can and
does occur in the cockpit on a daily basis. Most errors are
minute and therefore unimportantto the overall safety of the
flight. However, a combination of small errors may occur
causing a more serious safety incident. Currently the LOSA
system of error observation and review has been tested in a
small number of different airlines and the procedure
continues to develop. In order for the LOSA system to
progress and its use become more widespread, it is
important to have a complete understanding of the process
by which errors and threats in the cockpit can be detected
and dealt with in order to ensure flight safety. The present
paper addressesthe topic of error and threat detection. It will
focus attention on the process by which detection occurs,
incorporating knowledge fiom cognitive psychology and
physiological psychology.
Defiitions of Threat and Error
A great deal of attention has been paid to creation
of a taxonomy for understanding error. Dorner & Sachaub
(1994) and Wehner & Stadler (1 994) argue that human error
is an innate part of the human cognitive system. Dorner and
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Schaub link error to flaws in information processing that
include the tendency for humans to forget information, our
fear of being viewed as incompetence, and our inability to
manage all the facets of complex systems in a dynamic
environment. Wehner & Stadler attribute human error to
fundamental flaws and biases in human perceptual
processing, as articulated through Gestalt theories of
processing. Using a more social-cognitive h e w o r k , Kroll
& Ford (1992) link human error to failures in motivation.
Although the underlying causes of human error
may be diverse, Maurino, Reason, Johnson & Lee (2002)
present a comprehensive system for classieing errors using
the concepts of slips, lapses and mistakes. First,their model
indicates that all errors are unintentional, however they
occur for different reasons in different situations. Slips are
inappropriate actions taken during times when the actor is
engaged in well-practiced, well-learned tasks. Slips can be
based in lack of attention, a failure of memory, or a
misinterpretation of perceptual information. An example of
a slip is when a pilot accustomed to landing on a specific
runway during a familiar flight, fails to land on a different
runway even when clear air traffic commands have directed
him to the new runway. Lapses, on the other hand, occur
when the actor fails to perform a necessary action. An
example of a lapse may be when one is baking a cake and
forgets to put sugar in the recipe, or omits a necessary action
fiom a pre-flight checklist.
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Maurino et al. (1995) also consider the case of
mistakes. Although the errors they may create are
unintentional, mistakes involve intentional actions. Mistakes
occur when, through lack of knowledge or understanding,
the actor chooses the wrong course of action or applies the
wrong rules to solve a problem. For example, a pilot may
respond to a cockpit alarm by performing the wrong
checklist, even though helshe believes it to be correct.
Dorner & Schaub (1994) used Reason's (1990)
model of understanding error and applied it to mistakes
made in complex domains. Dorner & Schaub argue that
there are six different components of the action regulation
system and that mistakes can and do occur in each phase of
the process. The fmt step in the system is goal regulation.
Errors made at this level of the system involve either a lack
of attention paid to initial goal elaboration, or an inability to
recognize competing goals within the system and one's
inability to reconcile all potential system needs. The second
step in the action regulation system involves the collection
of information and creation of hypotheses used to help
define future behavior and decision-making. In the second
step of action regulation, what Domer and Schaub refer to
as "channeling errors" are likely to occur. This type of error
is defined by the inability to develop a complete and
accurate decision-makingmodel, exacerbatedby the human
confirmatory bias, whereby we focus on information that
confirms what we already know or believe.
The third stage in action regulation is prognoses, in
which we are asked to extrapolate our actions into the
future, basing this projection on past and current
occurrences. Dorner and Schaub indicate that humans are
poor prognosticators due to our limited memory abilities.
We often forget the past and can not use it to accurately
judge the future. When change is not linear or occurs
quickly, our relatively poor prediction abilities decline even
further. The fourth step in action regulation is planning for
action. In complex systems we use the information we have
in memory to determine which actions need to occur.
Mistakes made at this step in the process often involve the
inability to recognize the side effects or long term
consequences of our actions. In complex systems this is a
grave concern. An action taken early on in a situation may
cause unforeseen consequences hours or days later. These
potential consequences lead to the fifth step in the action
regulation system, namely monitoring the effects of our
actions. In complex systems, the direct and indirect
consequences of actions may occur days, weeks, months or
years later. This delay creates a "deadtime" that needs to be
monitored. Humans, however have limited attention spans
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and often just forget to monitor the system for longterm
effects. Last, at the end of Domer and Schaub's (1994),
regulation cycle, humans optimally engage in intensive selfreflection about their actions. However, again humans often
neglect to critically examine their decisions and actions due
to fear of repercussions or the desire to avoid feeling
incompetent. However, a lack of self-reflection leads to
fostering further incompetence in the future.
Sarter and Alexander (2000) used the Maurino et
al. fiamework to analyze aviation-based errors as compiled
using Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident
reports. Of the 245 ASRS incidents that were examined in
the study, 20.1 % were classified as slips, 4 1.4% were lapses
and 38.5% were mistakes. The most frequently occuning
aviation errors tended to be altitude deviations (35.9%),
heading or course deviations (32.2%) and runway incursions
(10.2%).
In contrast to errors, threats imply recognizable
hazards that are perceived as serious and must be
ameliorated effectively and swiftly (Kinney, 1996).
Furthermore, threats can be classified as either direct or
conditional.Direct threats are threats that are clearly defined
and whose consequences are known. For example, loss of
hydraulic power is a direct threat to the safety of the flight.
Conditional threats are those which involve a set or series of
actions and whose consequences are only determinedby that
set of actions. Conditional threats include "if' statements,
such as "if I lose the right engine, then there will be a threat
to passenger safety." When the conditional action does not
occur, the threat ceases to exist.
Errors and threats exist in relationship to one
another. While errors may be small, undetected, isolated
incidents that may or may not affect the overall health of a
flight, Reason (1990) and Maurino, et al. (1995) provide a
framework for understanding how errors may evolve into
threats. It is proposed that errors can accumulate under local
working conditions, at the same time existing defenses and
safeguards may break down or fail. When these two
conditions occur, an accident trajectory is created, which
can culminate in a critical safety incident. While errors
alone may not create accidents or unsafe conditions, the
accumulation of errors can create dangerous situations. The
awareness of this fact and the recognition of the need for
immediate action can be labeled as a threat.
Threot and Error Detection
Regardless of what we know about the
classification of errors and how they combine to create a
threatening event, much less is known about the detection of
errors and threats. Sellen (1994) defines error detection as
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"knowing (either consciously or subconsciously) that an
error has occurred" (p. 476). Following detection the actor
may also engage in error identification and error recovery.
For the purposes of this paper, we will concentrate on the
identificationprocess. In addition to elaboratingon the error
identification process, we will focus on the concept of threat
d&ection. Threat detection differs from simple error
detection in that threat detection is associated with a
negative emotional valence and in some cases with
potentially disastrous consequences (Kinney, 1996).
The detection of errors and threats is crucial to
aviation safety. As mentioned earlier, errors are believed to
occur in all cockpit operations. It is only when errors
multiply, are recognized, and are determined to be a threat
to safety that a serious problem results.
Although
conceptualization of error has a fairly lengthy literature
associated with it, the error detection literature is less
articulated and is quite complex. A general overview of this
process will follow with detailed analysis of the
physiological, emotional and cognitive elements included in
later sections of the paper.
A general view of error detection. How and when
do humans detect errors in their actions? Error detection is
a complex phenomenon requiring that the information
processing, emotional processing and physiological systems
of humans work together to detect errors that have escalated
to a level of threat in the environment. In general, however,
some simple conclusionscan be drawn about error detection
based on prior literatwe. First, it appears that error detection
is contingent upon level of expertise and development of
domain-specific declarative knowledge(Blandin & Proteau,
2000; Ohlsson, 1996). Thus the more expertise one has, the
more likely one is to recognize that an error has occurred.
This would also imply that over time, with domain-specific
experience and practice, most individuals would become
more skilled at error detection and recovery. Domer &
Schaub (1 994) supportthis conclusion and state that the best
way to detect errors is through training in which individuals
develop knowledge by being confronted with any errors
they have committed. LOSA is an example of a review and
training program that utilizes this premise. Second, there is
evidence that motivation plays a role in error detection
(Kroll & Ford, 1992). Individuals with high task-orientation,
a motivational state in which task engagement is strong, do
better at recognizing errors than individuals with a more
ego-based orientation. An ego orientation is reflective of a
motivational style that is competitive and outcome-oriented,
rather than the process-based task orientation.
A limited amount of research has examined

general error detection processing. Sellen (1 994) examined
detection of everyday errors in a sample of 75 individuals.
In Sellen's study, participants kept daily diaries participants
that detailed their errors and how they became aware of
them. Sellen was able to create a framework for classifying
error detection. In action-based detection, errors are caught
due to the perceptual system detecting the error. In most
cases the visual system perceives (sees) the error, bat
detection can also be auditory, or proprioceptive. In
aviation, alarms and warning lights alert the pilot to the error
and it is detected. In outcome-based detection, errors are
detected based on the undesired or unanticipated
consequence of the action. Outcome-based detection is the
most frequently occurring form of detection. In aviation, it
may not be until a runway incursion has occurred that the
initial error in flight operations has been detected. The third
form of detection is referred to as limiting h c t i o n
detection. In the case of limiting function detection, errors
are caught because the error has created a situation in the
physical environment in which further action is not possible.
In low altitude, high speed flight, free time is very limited.
An error may create a CFlT accident. Due to limited free
time, avoidance of the accident is impossible. Last, errors
can be undetected. Sellen defines undetected emors as those
that are detected, but by someone other than the actor. This
is the second most prevalent form of error detection. In
aviation, an error may be detected by a member of the flight
crew other than the pilot, or by ATC. Overall, Sellen (1994)
provides a fundamental framework for categorizing error
detection, based upon actual empirical information.
In a similar vein, Sarter and Alexander (2000) also
examined how errors were detected in the aviation domain.
In a majority of the cases, the error was not caught by the
aircrew or by the individual committing the error, but rather
by ATC (52.7%). In the 43% of cases where the error was
detected by a crew member, a majority of the time the error
was detected by the person who committed the error.
Results of this study underlie the need to study error
detection further. Specifically, in the aviation domain, error
detection needs to be studied as it relates to group action,
and how it occurs in complex and dynamic environments.
The remainder of this paper will explore threat and
error detection in much greater detail, focusing on
physiological, emotional and cognitive elements associated
with the process of detection. This project is meant to be a
blueprint for understanding the process of error and threat
detection, providing researchers with potential avenues for
future inquiry.

JAAER, Fall 2004

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2004

3

Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 [2004], Art. 4

Error and Threat
Physiological and Emotional Correlates of Threat
Detection
Threat detection can be broken down into three
fbndamental modules, physiology, emotion, and cognition.
Although each one has their own separate processes, they
are all linked through the structures in the brain.
Physiological psychologists describehuman cognitionusing
a network model. Knowledge structures are stored in
memory as nodes that are linked to each other based on
strong associations. When certain memories are triggered,
other memories that are strongly associated with the original
memory may also be triggered. In threat detection, emotion
strengthensthe associations. Events,or objects are perceived
as more threatening if they are associated with negative
emotions. The neural networks that tie emotion into
cognition include a direct connection to the brain's primary
motivational systems (Lang, Davis, & Ohrnan, 2000). These
motivational systems are driven by appetitive (positive) and
adverse (negative) stimuli. Adverse stimuli trigger fear
within the brain's defense mechanisms that help identify the
stimuli as threatening. It has been found that functional
activation in the occipital cortex was more extensive when
the arousal stimuli included such things as scenes of violent
deaths, threats, and erotica (Bradley, Sabatinelli, Lang,
Fitzsimmons, King, & Desai, 2003). This shows that
arousing stimuli create a longer activation of the visual or
occipital cortex, which in turn creates a motivated attention
toward the threat, and facilitates the processing of the
adverse stimuli (Bradley, Sabatinelli, Lang, Fitzsimmons,
King, & Desai, 2003).
The term "fight or flight" has been used to describe
the physiological and psychological response to a threat that
is automatic and involuntary(Ratey, 200 1). W i g "fight or
flight", the brain stem will release increased quantities of
norepinephrine, which in turn causes the adrenal glands to
release more adrenaline. An increase in adrenaline causes
faster heart rate, pulse rate, and respiration rate. There is
also, shunting of the blood to more vital areas, and release
of blood sugar, lactic acid and other chemicals, all of which
are involved in readying one for fighting the danger, or
running away from the threat. Feelings of dread, fear,
impending doom, are also common. Threat triggers various
physiological reactions that help us cope with a dangerous
situation. These reactions give humans the change to fight
or escape.
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Physiology and Error Detection
In contrast to threat detection, error detection is
much more cognitively influenced and is more associated
with the monitoring systems of the brain. These monitoring
systems compare correct performance and the current
performance at the same time causing a negative event
related potential (ERP) 80ms after the response (Ullsperger,
Yves von Cramen, & Muller, 2002). The anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), which is associated with attentional and
cognitive control has been shown to be activated during
error detection (Van Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, &
Carter, 2001). Van Veen, et al. found that the ACC
"contributes to executive functions through the detection of
conflicts occurring at later or response-related levels of
processing" (pg. 1302). The lateral prefiontal cortex has also
been shown to assist in responding to conflicts and
interference and helping the ACC with performance
monitoring.
Future studies may help to link threat and error detection
through the biological makeup of the brain. Error detection
utilizes the monitoring systems of the brain to compare
current situationsand the correct actions to detect a possible
negative consequence. These errors create negative even
related potentials in the cingulatedmotor area of the anterior
cingulated cortex. The monitoring system is spread out
between the anterior cingulated cortex, and the lateral
prefrontal cortex.
A review of physiological functioning indicates
that the brain is a very complex structure housing cognition,
behavior and emotions. Our bodies can react to a threat
without being consciously aware of the stimulus, while at
the same time, the brain's cognitive structures can be
activated in order to take the correct action to alleviate the
threat. Reactions to threat, such as affect, startle, and
freezing, help to imbed the memory of the event into a
linked network to assist in future threat detection. Emotion
creates a motivated attention that stimulates the sensory
regions of the brain, which in turn increases the organism's
fine tune scanning abilities. Most research identifies the
difference between threat and error detection through the
presence or absence of emotion. Emotion and motivated
attention are more highly associated with threat detection
than with error detection. In contrast, error detection occurs
primarily in the cortical areas of brain. Areas of brain
activation associated with threat and error detection are
presented in Figure 1.
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Figure I.
Brain activation associated with threat detection and error detection.

Cognitive Aspects o f E m r and Threat Detection

It should be noted that much of the following
section discussescognitiveaspects ofthreatdetection,rather
than error detection. This is due to the fact that little
research has focused on error detection, while attending to
and acting on threats has been a priority of many aviation
researchers. In the works described, e m is 0 t h assumed
to be a precursor of threat, such that a focus on error is one
of reduction or elimination, rather than simple detection.
Tomaka, Kibler, Blascovich & Ernst (1997)
categorize appraisal of a situation as critical in determining
its threat level. Furthermore they divide the appraisal
process into two components, threat and challenge. Tomaka
et al. believe that when a situation is perceived as falling
within the person's resources, the task is labeled as
challenging. When the task exceeds the personal resources,
it becomes a threat. This interpretive bias reflects the
importance of the availability of cues that help humans
determine if a situation should be label a threat or a
challenge.
Warnings are important aids to facilitate appraisal
of a situation. Frequently, warnings are added into user
interfaces to help improve usability, increase efficiency and
lower attentional demand. However, low attentional
demands create sensory adaptations and individualsceaseto
respond to non-valid warnings if the hquency of their
occurrence is high. This is called the cry-wolf effect (Maltz
and Meyer, 2001). The probability that a warning will
actually predict that danger will occur is called the positive
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predictive value (PPV). Research on warnings tends to
follow the ideas of signal detection theory. Signal detection
theory involves determining the threshold of a person's
ability to detect the correct stimulus fiom background noise.
Researchers look at the hits, misses, and false alarms of the
participants and determine at what level individuals go
beyond optimal appraisal and responding, and begin making
e m .
Rozelle and Baxter (1975) also showed that
appraisal of potentially threatening situations can be also
based on the integration of contextual cues and dispositional
traits of the individuals involved. This research found that
police officers used contextual cues to infer the presence of
danger to a greater extend then dispositional cues. However,
this tendency was reversed for situations in which the
situation indicated that the potential for danger was low.
Experience of the officer also correlated with decisionmaking. Experienced police officers were more likely to
use integrative decision-making focused on both contextual
determinants of behavior and enduring personality traits of
the target individual. Less experienced police officers made
appraisals based primarily on personality or perceived
dispositional characteristics of the target.
Situation awareness. and threat. Perhaps the most
valuable way to explain the role of cognition in threat and
error detection is through the idea of situation awareness.
Situation awareness (SA) has become a buzzword in recent
time and has been used in all sorts of domains. Its prime use
has been in aviation. In order to measure situation
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awareness, it needs to be broken down into fundamental
principles and problems. Endsley (1995) defines situation
awareness as the ''perception of the stimuli of the
environment within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their
behavior in the near future (pg. 36)." This means that pilots
first has to perceive the stimuli around them using their
senses, then comprehend their meaning, significance, or
danger, and finally predict how the stimuli will react. Each
of these processes need to be improved in order to enhance
situation awareness.
This definition of SA does not represent all of the
individual's knowledge but just pf that of the dynamic
environment (Endsley, 1995). Environmental features are
initially processed in parallel through pre-attentive sensory
stores in which certain properties are detected. These
properties include spatial proximity, color, simple shapes,
and movement. The objects that stand out the most will be
further processed using focalized attention, reflecting the
importance of cue salience. Attention is a major element in
perceiving and processing cues for threat detection and
responke. In complex and dynamic environments,
information overload and multiple tasks can put a strain on
a person's attention capabilities.
Errors in SA during action selection can degrade
the decision making process (Endsley, 1995). SA involves
using mental models, prior knowledge, schema, and
reasoning in making decisions. Acquiring and maintaining
the attentional and conceptual processes that facilitate SA
involves significant cognitive resources. Acquiring and
maintaining SA should be thought of as an integral part of
an individual's workload and repertoire.
SA is broken up into the process and the product.
"The product refers to the state of awareness in terns of
information and knowledge, while the process refers to the
various perceptual and cognitive activities involved in
constructing updating and revising the state of awareness
(Adams, Teney, & Pew, 1995, pg. 88)". Although both are
individually important, they can't work without each other.
If environmental cues are ignored (process) it could be that
these cues were not part of awareness (product).
It is very important to have some sort of
knowledge base of the situation when detecting a threat.
This knowledge is organized in the form of a mental model
or a schema to help anticipate information and is stored in
long-term memory. A mental model is a cognitive
h e w o r k cognitively designed by a person to generate
explanationsof a situationsor systemspurpose and function.
It is this mental model that allows an individual to help
make predictions about how the environment will react
(Smith, and Hancock, 1995). The ability to think ahead is a
very important part of situational awareness in aviation and
threat detection in general (Adams, Teney, & Pew, 1995).
Problems in threat detection can then arise when the
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environment defies critical cognitive functions such as
activation of mental models, and may include situations
where critical information is not available, it takes too long
to execute a task or attention is directed elsewhere. If an
individual fails to develop a mental model for a particular
situation, then helshe will fail to detect the threat even
though the situation may be familiar (Endsley, 1995).
Workload and threat. Within aviation, pilots are
required to attend to many knowledge intensive and
procedurally complex tasks all at one time. This limits the
attention that can be devoted to scan for threats. These
multitasking demands can cause pilots to initiate errors
because of the high task load and cognitive demands on
memory. In a study done by Jones and Endsley (1996), it
was found that high cognitive workload caused 30% off all
situation awareness errors and 35% of those people couldn't
pick out threat cues that were clearly present. In a research
example, Gugerty (1997) tested driver's knowledge of
surrounding cars with direct recall and indirect performance
measures. They found that a driver's knowledge of nearby
cars is largely explicit and not implicit, meaning that they
know where the cars are through experience and active
rehearsal, and not through untraceable knowledge. When
there were too many cars to track, the drivers used cues to
focus on cars that might have been a threat. Gugerty also
found that drivers remembered the location of hazardous
cars better when they were driving than when they were in
the passenger seat.
One factor that alleviates the negative effects of
high workload is experience (Adams, Tenney, & Pew,
1995). With greater expertise one is better able to direct
attention to threat cues that are important. Expertise
facilitates decision-making and developing accurate
expectations about future events. As a result of enhanced
cognitive processing, expertise in a situation can help to
reduce workload and make an individual better prepared to
accurately detect and assess threat. It has been shown that
experts have highly developed management and planning
skills that help them perform efficiently (Adams, Tenney, &
Pew, 1995). In aviation, expert pilots would then use
experience and procedural knowledge in their judgments,
while avoiding the use of less reliable heuristics to
determine level of threat and plan present and future
behaviors.
Threat detection and suatial awareness. The
efficiency of one's spatial awareness is also important in
determining a threat. Pilots, astronauts, and submariners
possibly have the most spatially tasking jobs in the world.
Each profession has to move a craft in a three dimensional
space that is filled with hazards. Besides maintaining the
orientation of the craft, the pilots must navigate the vehicle
to the proper waypoints (Wickens, 2002). Spatial awareness
needs to be heightened in order to make the environmental
cues used for threat detection more accessible to the pilot.
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Wickens (2002) describes three issues in display design for
spatial awareness. The " h e of reference" issue concerns
whether information should be presented from the pilot's
h e of reference (egocentric) or fiom a world view
(exocentric). These are usually termed inside-out and
outside-in respectively. An inside-out display involves the
cmft moving on a stationary world. An outside-in display
involved a stationary craft with the world moving around it.
Wickens (2002) argues that the type of display should
depend on the task and the user. Egocentric views are good
for flight control and tracking. Exocentric views are good
for threat detection. These exocentric displays are usually
depicting the airplane fiom behind and aboye. The second
issue (degree of integration) is concerned with whether it is
better to use a 3D display of motion or a 2D display of
motion. 3D motion creates an ambiguity to locating the
objects in space and 2D motion creates more attentional
demands and cognitive loads on the individual. The third
issue (prediction)is important to be able to determine what
will happen in the future. Displays should help the pilot
cope with lag time and be useful in controlling the craft. The
display needs to show where the craft will be in a certain
amount of time or after an input. Current technology on this
issue is limited because many factors predict what will
happen to the craft. A display that channels attention to the
forward flight path inhibits attention to surrounding threats,
even if they are displayed elsewhere in the cockpit. This
means in addition to a good display the pilot needs to have
good task management skills, allocate attention to sources
of information for performance, and anticipate unexpected
events in the environment.
Tlrreat and Error Management

While detecting threats and errors is extremely
important, action still needs to follow detection. Knowing
how to manage a threat and/or error is very important in
creating effective cockpit operations and eliminating fatal
accidents. While error doesn't create an outburst ofemotion,
threat is driven by emotion. Threats create an increase in
anxiety and arousal. Learning how to cope with threat is
important in helping to decrease anxiety, and stress, while
increasing performance. William Glasser (1989) developed
a theory called choice theory in which he believed that the
only behavior that can be controlled is one's own. We
always have choice or control over our own lives and
behaviors. This concept is key to controlling threats.
Solomon, Holmes, & McCaul (1980) found that when
participants exercised control over a threat it reduced
anxiety. This was found only when the control was easy to
execute. In kt,just knowing that they may be able to
control the threat decreased participants' anxiety levels
while anticipating the threat. The problem is that difficult
methods of control actually create more anxiety.
Inaviation, crew resource management (CRM) can
be thought of as an error management or error
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countermeasure system. CRM helps avoid, trap, and reduce
the consequences of errors, thus also eliminating the need
for threat detection (Helmreich, Memtt, & Wilhelm, (1999).
Errors can be reduced by creating proper checklists,
fostering active communication and monitoring skills, and
understanding the sources of the error. CRM can help
convince the crew that errors are unavoidable, but by
understanding human cognition and limitations, errors can
be reduced. CRM can effectively teach the crew how to
cope with stress, which in turn allows them to deal with
threats. CRM has been developed into advanced
qualification programs (AQP) that are designed by each
airline to meet their standards and regulations. In AQP
programs, training is presented in realistic environments to
put flightcrews in realistic situations with simulated
stressors, and the potential for errors and threat detection to
occur.
DISCUSSION
It is clear from the review of the literature that
threat and error detection is a complex process involving
cognitive, physiological and emotional components. Figure
1 provides a flow chart with topic linkages related to error
and threat detection. However complex, certain conclusions
can be drawn from this literature and recommendations can
be made about optimizing threat and error detection in
aviation.
First, it is evident that humans are not very good at
detecting error (Sellen, 1994), especially errors that are
small and have no immediate effects on the working
environment. When an error is detected, it is often
recognized by someone other than the individual initiating
the error. In aviation, air traffic control is the most frequent
detector of errors, following by the individual committing
the error and hislher crew members (Sarter & Alexander,
2000).
Second, we know that error and threat detection
comprise two different processes. Error detection occurs
primarily in the coritcal centers of the brain, while threat
detection involves the limbic and reticular activating
systems, indicating a large emotional component in that
process. Error detection requires cognitive attention and
focused awareness of the operator. When errors accumulate
or the situation becomes more unsafe, as in the case of
catastrophic safety problems, the threat detection system
takes over and creates immediate awareness. Unfortunately,
the emotional component of threat detection necessary for
immediate physical activation also carries inherent faults in
that over-arousal in humans is associated with impaired
performance and cognitive judgment.
Aviation has always been concerned with
increasing safety. To that end, many systems have been
automated with built-in protections that alert users to
potential threats and errors. Some of these systems even
provide solutions to identified threats. However, it will be
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many years, if ever, that the human will be completely taken
out of the cockpit. Until that time, aviation researches and
practitioners also need to consider ways to enhance human
error and threat detection in aviation environments. Given
known limitations of human error and threat detection
systems, what suggestionscan be made to enhance error and
threat awareness in aviation?
The fmt recommendation that can be made is to
create an error awarenessculture that diffuses responsibility
for error detection and reporting across the entire work team
or aircrew. Research has shown that error detection often
does not come fiom the operator, but from a fellow crew
member or air traffic control. Error ,detection then becomes
everyone's business. Reporting the small errors that are
inevitable in aviation operations, as indicated via the LOSA
system, must be mandatory and result not in punishment, but
in a show of support for safe crew operations.
Second, aircrews must engage in extensive and
ongoing training for increases in expertise. The literature is
clear that domain experts are better able to recognize error,
and they do so sooner than novices or trained novices. Not
only are they better at recognizing errors, they are better
able to respond to and cope with threatening situations
incurred by the errors. Therefore, employing pilots and
crewmembers with higher levels of expertise is important.
Norman (1998) estimates that expertise does not occur until
an individual has 5,000 hours or 10 years of domain-specific
experience. This is not a small amount of time or effort. If
this is the case, continued training of new pilots and flight
attendants is crucial to bring those crewmembers to a level
of expertise more quickly. LOSA actually should contribute
to the training process and development of expertise. The
safety audits done in LOSA should make aircrew members
more knowledgeable about their own behaviors in the
cockpit, the types of errors committed in the course of daily
operation, and how to prevent these errors in the future.
Increases in knowledge as a result of LOSA should
contribute to schema change and enrichment, resulting in
lasting performance gains.
Next, although this may be difficult, it is important
to begin to develop training in the areas of prospective
memory and extrapolation of current events into the future.
Prospective memory refers to the process by which memory
is sustained over long periods of time, requiring humans to
remember to engage in actions in the future. In the absence
of memory cues, humans are not good at prospective
memory tasks, often forgetting to complete a cycle of
activity or to engage in a necessary task at the right time or
place. This may not only contribute to the accumulation of
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error in flight operations, but can be disasttous.
Part of development of prospective awareness
skills will also involve development of knowledge about
extrapolating fiom present events into the future. Again,
human are weak in identifLing the longterm impact of
current actions or events. This weakness is well-elaborated
by Edward Tenner (1996), who writes about revenge effects
in the development of products and solutions geared toward
aiding human existence. For example, the infant walker,
designed to aid babies in development of walking skills,
actually had the longterm effect of delaying crawling and
walking in infants by a month or more. In aviation, a small
error made early in a flight may not have a long term effect
at all, or the effect may be delayed for hours, days or
months. If the operator of the system cannot extrapolate the
potential results of a small error, then the system itself
becomes faulty and unsafe.
Thus, it is absolutely necessary to teach pilots and
crewmembers how to think about problem solving in both
a short term and long term manner. Using the concepts of
situation awareness (SA) may facilitate this process.
Situation awareness has components of both present and
future action. The key is to focus on training for future
awareness, probably the least elucidated part of the SA
perspective. Training for future knowledge, analysis and
decision-making is an area that is ripe for intensive study
and development of training strategies.
Last, although training in aviation and the safety
culture it engenders is quite advanced, research and
development about error and threat detection is necessary to
advance aviation safety to a new standard. Aviation is the
safest form of transportation, however every accident can
cost hundreds of lives and millions of dollars. Development
of techniques to increase aircrews' awareness of error and
threat would further limit the repercussions of aviation
accidents. This report has attempted to create a state of the
art review of what we currently know about error and threat
detection. It is hoped that aviation researchers and
organizations take this knowledge and use it to create an
even safer flying environment in the future. To better serve
future researchers in this area, Figure 2 provides a list of
potential research areas directly related to error and threat
detection. It is critical that researchers and practitioners in
the field of aviation utilize this information to provide a
more complete picture of how human detect and manage
error and threat.
This research was funded through a faculty
research grant from the Office of the Vice-Provost for
Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. .)
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